Jo Ann Brooks (Nunley) v. Thomas N. Brooks : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Jo Ann Brooks (Nunley) v. Thomas N. Brooks :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randal J. Holmgren; Attorney for Appellant.
Paul H. Liapis; Liapis, Gray & Stegall; Kim M. Luhn; Green & Luhn; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









U • - . . - » •-
*: i 
OKET K 
o • -i 
970133 
OUSSUeff. APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
THOMAS N. BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. 
Case No. 920733-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court 880904192 
-ooOoo-
APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED 
ON OCTOBER 2, 1992 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING 
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, ESQ. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
PAUL H. LIAPIS, ESQ. (1956) 
LIAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL 
48 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
KIM M. LUHN (5105) 
GREEN & LUHN 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
DEC 1 0 1S93 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-




THOMAS N. BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. 
Case No. 920733-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court 880904192 
00O00-
APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED 
ON OCTOBER 2, 1992 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING 
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, ESQ. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
PAUL H. LIAPIS, ESQ. (1956) 
LIAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL 
48 Market Street, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
KIM M. LUHN (5105) 
GREEN & LUHN 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY iii 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 1 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS RELATING TO MR. BROOKS* 
INCOME ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE. AS A RESULT, IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION TO FIND NO CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY MR. BROOKS' CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION. HOWEVER, THE SAME EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHES THAT IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE 
MINOR CHILD'S PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES IN 
ADDITION TO HIS CHILD SUPPORT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO OFFSET HIS 
OBLIGATION TO PAY ONE-HALF OF MICHELLE'S 
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS RECEIVED BY MICHELLE AS A RESULT OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S DISABILITY. 
POINT III • 11 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE 
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH 
AMOUNTS CLAIMED AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL. 
POINT IV 13 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADJUST 
DEFENDANT'S INCOME TO REFLECT A HIGHER AND 
ARTIFICIAL "TAXABLE GROSS INCOME". 
i 
POINT V 1 
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ORDER THE 
PARTIES TO SHARE EQUALLY THE COSTS OF 
TRANSPORTATION FOR DEFENDANT'S VISITATION WITH 
THE PARTIES* MINOR CHILD. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD MR. BROOKS HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING THE CROSS-APPEAL. 
CONCLUSION 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES AND RULES 
P a q e 
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1993) 4, 8, 10, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992) 15 
Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 
Rule 34 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 
CASES CITED 
United States v. Devalle 704 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1983) . . . . 8 
In Re: Henry 1993 WL 421675 (111.) 9 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes 
a. prospective income from any source, including non-
earned sources, except under Subsection (3); and 
b. income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, 
bonuses, rents, gift from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony 
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers compensation benefits, 
unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits 
and payments from "non means-tested" government programs. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under 
Subsection (7). 
iii 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a 
finding is made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. 
(8) (b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the 
parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the 
amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other 
unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent 
depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
IV 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS RELATING TO MR. BROOKS1 
INCOME ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE. AS A RESULT, IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION TO FIND NO CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY MR. BROOKS' CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION. HOWEVER, THE SAME EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHES THAT IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE 
MINOR CHILD'S PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES IN 
ADDITION TO HIS CHILD SUPPORT. 
Mrs. Nunley argues on appeal that the Court's findings 
relating to Mr. Brooks' income are clearly erroneous. To support 
this argument, Mrs. Nunley relies on what she alleges are 
unexplained deposits into his bank account and on her claim that 
the Court should have imputed income to Mr. Brooks. Neither 
argument is supported by the record. 
To begin first with the deposits into Mr. Brooks' account, 
there is absolutely no basis to claim that these deposits were 
"unexplained". To the contrary, Defendant's Exhibit 11 is a 
detailed explanation of the source of all but approximately 
$2,000.00 of the deposits at issue. It established as follows: 
Deposits to checking account (5/16/88 - 7/17/90) $173,650.68 
Less proceeds from defendant's sale of home 
in Los Angeles - 43,649.91 
Less proceeds from defendant's second 
mortgage loan from Ronnie Hansen - 15,000.00 
Less credit card advances (6/16/88-7/17/90) - 17,687.59 
Less loans from defendant's family 
Brother - 2,025.50 
Father - 23,000.00 
Adjusted Balance (5/16/88 - 7/17/90) $72,287.68 
Less Pension Income 
5/88 to 7/88 - 1,916.88 x 3 - 5,750.64 
8/88 to 7/89 - 1,992.77 x 12 - 23,913.24 
8/89 to 7/90 - 2,077.23 x 12 - 24,926.76 
$ 17,697.04 
Less Pension adjustment check 
Insurance payment - 4,000.00 
Security wages - 3,462.00 
Tax refunds - 789.00 
Trout (food reimbursement) -750.00 
Insurance medicine (reimbursement) - 1,051.00 
$ 7,646.04 
Less 6/15/90 Pension adjustment check - 5, 346 . 23 
$ 2,299.81 
Exhibit 11 is clear and unequivocal evidence supporting the 
Court's finding that, although the Court believed the parties did 
not reveal all of their income, any additional income earned by Mr. 
Brooks did not rise to the level of a substantial change of 
circumstances. (See Finding No. 10 R. 1056-57) In addition, many 
of the deposits upon which Mrs. Nunley seeks to rely are not even 
in the nature of income. Instead, they are proceeds from the sale 
of a house and loan proceeds. As such, they would not be 
considered in the Court's determination of child support in any 
event. 
Mrs. Nunley also argues that the Court should have imputed 
income to Mr. Brooks consistent with his historical earning 
capacity. Although Mr. Brooks had worked on occasion since his 
medical retirement from the L.A. Police Department, at the time of 
trial, he was unable to do so due to medical restrictions imposed 
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by his doctors. Although Mrs. Nunley argues it was error to admit 
Mr. Brooks' own testimony as to his medical condition, it is clear 
that the testimony related to his personal experiences and 
information within his personal knowledge. 
For example, Mr. Brooks testified about his heart attack on 
January 14, 1991, only three months prior to trial; his medical 
disability rating from the L.A. Police Department; his two 
surgeries since his retirement; his Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome; 
the medications he was currently taking, including nitroglycerin, 
cortisone sinequan, zanex, halcyon codeine and fiorinal; and his 
thyroid disease, ulcer disease and heart disease. (R. 119-1204) 
All of this testimony is clearly within the personal knowledge 
of Mr. Brooks, and therefore it is admissible pursuant to Rule 602 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states: 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence 
to prove personal knowledge may, but need not consist of 
the witness' own testimony . . . 
While the rule is made subject to the provisions of Rule 703 
relating to expert testimony, the nature of Mr. Brooks' testimony 
was clearly within the provisions of Rule 602 because he 
experienced the heart attack and surgeries; he was retired based on 
his disability rating; and he knows what medications he takes and 
from what diseases he suffers. Mr. Brooks would point out to this 
Court that the trial court did strike his testimony where he and 
his counsel allegedly characterized the testimony (R. 1200) and 
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where Mr. Brooks1 testimony consisted of hearsay evidence relating 
to the fact that the physician treating him after his heart attack 
said he only "had two minutes to live by the time they got the clot 
out." (R. 1200-1201) The remaining evidence was properly allowed 
and received by the Court, and it clearly supports a finding that 
Mr. Brooks was medically retired and unable to work. He was, 
therefore, not under-employed for purposes of imputing income to 
him to determine his child support obligation pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992). 
Given that all deposits into his account were clearly 
explained and given the fact that Mr. Brooks was not under-employed 
pursuant to the statute, the Court's finding that Mr. Brooks1 gross 
monthly retirement income was $3,029.00, is accurate and clearly 
supported by the evidence. 
From this point there can be no dispute that there was an 
insufficient basis to modify Mr. Brooks1 child support obligation. 
Using the $3,029.00 figure in the child support guideline work 
sheet, together with Mrs. Nunley's stipulated income of $833 per 
month, Mr. Brooks1 child support obligation would only be $250.00 
per month (R. 223). This amount is $50.00 less than his $300.00 
per month obligation as set forth in the Decree of Divorce! 
Therefore, there is no factual or legal basis upon which the Court 
could have modified the Decree to increase Mr. Brooks1 child 
support obligation. The decision was not an abuse of discretion 
and should be upheld. 
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Conversely, however, it was inconsistent and an abuse of 
discretion for the Court to use the very same evidence to modify 
the Decree of Divorce to require Mr. Brooks to pay for a portion of 
Michelle's private school expenses in addition to his child support 
obligation. 
To begin with, there is no finding by the lower Court in this 
case that there was a substantial change of circumstances to 
warrant the modification. Such a finding would be clearly 
erroneous. First, although the original Decree was silent in this 
regard, the child was in private school at the time of the parties1 
divorce, and Mrs. Nunley was paying all costs associated therewith. 
Second, the lack of a substantial change of circumstances in the 
parties1 financial circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase 
in Mr. Brooks1 child support obligation translates directly into a 
lack of a change circumstances to warrant a modification in Mr. 
Brooks' obligation to pay a portion of the child's private school 
expenses. Third, although the Plaintiff seeks to rely on the cost 
differential between Westchester Private School in Los Angeles and 
Rolland Hall St. Marks to establish the necessary change of 
circumstances, it is anticipated that a private grade school would 
be more expensive than a private pre-school, and therefore such an 
increase could have been anticipated at the time of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce. As a result, there is not, as Mrs. Nunley 
argues, any basis in the record to support any finding that there 
was a change in circumstances sufficient to support the Court's 
5 
order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay one-half of Michelle's private 
school expenses. Even if there was a substantial change of 
circumstances, the Court clearly erred in finding that Mr. Brooks 
had a financial ability to pay a portion of Michellefs private 
school expenses. Such a finding is necessary to support the 
Court's order. Instead, Mr. Brooks' income totalled $3,029 per 
month, or approximately $36,000 per year. From this amount he pays 
$3,600 per year for child support plus one-half of the child's 
transportation costs from Utah to Montana for visitation. The 
Court's order requires him now to pay an additional amount of 
between $3,000 to $4,000 per year for private school expenses, and 
in excess of $11,000 for arrearages in such expenses. This is 
clearly an abuse of discretion in light of Mr. Brooks' expenses 
which he submitted at time of trial totalling approximately 
$4,300.00 per month. (See Exhibit 7) 
Finally, although she offers no legal basis for it, Mrs. 
Nunley argues Mr. Brooks should be ordered to pay a portion of 
Michelle's private school expenses because he wants her in private 
school. However, this is not an accurate statement of Mr. Brooks' 
position because it is incomplete. Finding of Fact No. 18 relates 
to this issue and it states: 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enrolled the minor 
child in a private school, Rolland Hall St. Marks, and 
that she has expended substantial sums of money to keep 
said child in a private school. The Court further finds 
that both Plaintiff and Defendant are desirous for their 
child to be enrolled in private school. The Court finds 
that the Defendant noted that he did not believe that he 
6 
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Brooks has the financial ability to pay a portion of Michelle's 
private school expenses. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO OFFSET HIS 
OBLIGATION TO PAY ONE-HALF OF MICHELLE'S 
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS RECEIVED BY MICHELLE AS A RESULT OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S DISABILITY. 
In support of Mrs. Nunley's position that the Court could not, 
as a matter of law, apply the social security benefits received by 
Michelle toward satisfaction of the Defendant's obligation to pay 
her private school expenses, Mrs. Nunley relies on the provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). However, as outlined in Mr. Brooks' primary 
brief, § 407 is inapplicable to the facts of this case. It is 
clear from the case law that § 407 insulates debtors from the 
distraint action of a creditor to insure that the recipient has the 
financial resources necessary to meet their most basic financial 
needs for food and shelter. (See United States v. Devalle 704 F.2d 
1513 (11th Cir. 1983).) This is clearly not at issue in this case. 
Second, Mrs. Nunley also attempts to rely on case law from the 
states of California and New Mexico where such offsets are not 
allowed. Mr. Brooks recognizes that some states take this 
position. However, the Utah State Legislature has made its 
intention clear in this regard in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 
(1992). This statute clearly provides that: 
Social security benefits received by a child due to the 
earnings of parent may be credited as child support to 
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the parent whose earning record it is based, by crediting 
the amount against the potential obligation of that 
parent. Other unearned income of a child may bp 
considered as income to a parent ior-^ nd > n^ : --
circumstances of each case. 
(Emphas i s added . ) 
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[BJecause social security dependent disability beneiits 
are earned by the noncustodial parent, made on behalf of 
such parent, and, in fact, paid at least in part with 
contributions from the noncustodial parent's own 
earnings, payment of social security dependent disability 
benefits satisfies a noncustodial patent's eh i ] d support 
obligation. 
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clearly establish that the Court's refusal to allow the offset was 
based on the Court's belief it could not legally do so. The 
findings state: 
20.. The Court finds that subsequent to the trial in 
this matter, Plaintiff presented a letter, over the 
objection of the Defendant's counsel, from an employee of 
the Social Security Administration, dated July 12, 1991, 
indicating that the Court could not assign or determine 
how benefits paid to the minor child could be used. The 
Court was subsequently requested by counsel for Plaintiff 
to permit the filing of a Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of this social security issue and the Court 
found that the matter should be submitted to it under 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Defendant was to respond to that Motion within thirty 
(30) days after filing and no sooner than the 6th of 
September, 1991. 
21. The Court finds, after review of the matters 
submitted to it under the "Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination," that contrary to its April 26, 1991 trial 
Minute Entry, it does not have the power to assign the 
social security auxiliary benefits received by the 
parties' minor child (by reason of Defendant's permanent 
disability) to meet the Defendant's obligation to pay 
one-half of the child's private-school expenses. The 
social security auxiliary benefits received by the minor 
child do not reduce the disability benefits otherwise due 
to or received by the Defendant and, in fact, said 
auxiliary benefits are for the minor child's use only and 
cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other 
use. The Court finds that the Defendant should meet his 
obligation for one-half of the minor child's private 
school expenses from his own resources and not from the 
child's social security benefits. 
(Emphasis added) 
Given the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992), and 
the case law from an overwhelming majority of states, it is clear 
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in basing its 
decision not to allow the Defendant credit for the social security 
10 
benefits received by -M^hojle ^n . ^ ror*--J •. ' ) 
C'"* •-•> ' 'is nnrii'jn ,: ; lit; i' ui t" - uraer must be 
reversed an: : ne case remanded tor a determination consistent with 
the .aw. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE 
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH 
AMOUNTS CLAIMED AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL. 
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have been submitted pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which requires testimony to be presented orally at trial. 
In addition, it is not entirely accurate to say that the 
Affidavit was submitted with the Motion for Clarification. 
Instead, the Affidavit was submitted over five months after the 
Motion for Clarification with a pleading entitled "Motion for Post-
Trial Determination of Divorce Modification Issues." 
Similarly, the Plaintiff cannot rely on Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure because it was solely her own failure to 
present the evidence timely. A party's own failure to do something 
is not the type of "other reason" justifying relief as allowed in 
Rule 60(b)(7). The Affidavit would also not have been timely filed 
under Rule 60(b). 
Finally, an additional hearing on these issues would not have 
been superfluous as Mrs. Nunley claims. The evidence was never 
subject to cross-examination, and the Court never had the 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness submitting it. 
In addition, as outlined in the Defendant's primary appellate 
brief, the objections raised by Mr. Brooks included the facts that: 
(1) some of the documents had absolutely no reference to the date 
the expense was purportedly incurred by Mrs. Nunley; (2) certain of 
the documents which did have dates, placed those expenses at a time 
prior to Mrs. Nunley's filing of her Amended Petition to Modify 
despite the Court's order that she was entitled to reimbursement 
only from that day forward; (3) certain of the documents were 
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is not applicable to this issue and is, in fact, completely 
irrelevant. Instead, before the Court could take judicial notice 
of the calculation offered by the Plaintiff, the Court first had to 
make a legal determination as to whether the imputation of the 
additional amounts was legally appropriate. The Court correctly 
determined that it was not. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1992) governs the determination of 
a parties' gross income for purposes of computing a child support 
obligation. Subsection (1) states as follows: 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
a. prospective income from any source, including non-
earned sources, except under Subsection (3); and 
b. income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, 
bonuses, rents, gift from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony 
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers compensation benefits, 
unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits 
and payments from "non means-tested" government programs. 
(Emphasis added) 
It is clear that the Court's use of Mr. Brooks' $3,029.00 per 
month income was appropriate pursuant to this section. The income 
includes his pension benefits and his social security benefits, 
both of which are expressly included in the statutory definition of 
gross income. The statute does not differentiate between taxable 
and non-taxable gross income, and there is no legal authority upon 
which the Court may do so. The definition of gross income does not 
change simply because the recipient does not pay taxes on it. 
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Mrs. Nunley had left her employment at TWA voluntarily, the lower 
court found that t here had been a material change of circumstances 
on this issue on the basis that the Plaintiff could no longer 
provide the flight benefits. 
Contrary to Mrs. Nunleyfs argument on appeal, the issue was 
properly before the lower court both on the Plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify the Decree to require Defendant to pay all such costs and on 
the Defendant's Counter-Petition to enforce the Decree of Divorce 
and seeking judgment for amounts he alleged Mrs. Nunley was 
required but had failed to pay under the Decree. 
Also contrary to Mrs. Nunley1 s assertions, it was not an abuse 
of discretion under all of the facts and circumstances of this case 
to order each party to share these costs equally. Although Mrs. 
Nunley argues that Mr. Brooks had the greater ability to pay them, 
the evidence before the Court established that Mr. and Mrs. 
Nunleyfs gross income had been in excess of $80,000 for the years 
1986 through 1989, inclusive and Mrs. Nunleyfs business had gross 
sales of $251,120.00 in 1990. She had voluntarily left her 
employment with TWA to undertake this business, and Mr. Brooks1 
argued at trial that he believed the low cost flight benefits were 
still available as an airline courtesy to Mrs. Nunley through her 
current husband. Therefore, the parties both had an ability to pay 
these costs. Further, the parties have joint custody of their 
daughter and at the time of trial, Mrs. Nunley was refusing to 
allow Mr. Brooks to exercise his visitation unless he paid all 
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state. Instead, the issue was before the Court on Mrs. Nunley's 
own Petition to Modify. The decision that the parties share the 
costs equally is well within the district court's discretion. 
Because these issues are not well founded in law or fact, and 
because these arguments are frivolous, Mr. Brooks alleges the 
cross-appeal was filed simply to harass him for filing his own 
appeal. Mr. Brooks requests this Court award him his costs and 
fees incurred in defending against the cross appeal pursuant to 
Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding that Mr. Brooks1 gross monthly income was 
$3,029.00 is well supported by admissible evidence submitted at 
trial. From that point, it is clear that there was no substantial 
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of his 
child support obligation. The order should be upheld. However, 
the same facts clearly establish no change of circumstances to 
warrant the Court's order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of 
his daughter's private school expenses, and clearly establish his 
financial inability to pay those expenses. The order and 
arrearages should be vacated and the petition dismissed. In the 
alternative, Mr. Brooks is entitled to apply social security 
benefits received by the minor child as a result of his disability 
toward this obligation, and he is entitled to a hearing on the 
expenses claimed prior to entry of a judgment. Under this 
alternative, the case must be remanded for a new trial. Finally, 
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the Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the parties to 
share equally the visitation transportation costs of the minor 
child. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th of December, 1993. 
LIAPIS^GRAY & STEGALL 
PAUL H. LIAPI 
GREEN & LUHN 
( / ^ ^ ^ ~ - » 
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